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THE RECALL AS PRACTICED IN KENTUCKY
SOME NINETY YEARS AGO
Being an Account of the Old and New Court Contro-
versy, with Side Remarks on Political Shibboleths and
Parties Then and Now.
The Athenians knew the evils of corners in wheat, and by their
laws severely punished the Leiters of their day. The clear headed pagan,
Aristotle, evolved an elaborate set of eugenic rules, anticipating our most
"modern" science by 2200 years. David Hume in the seventeenth chapter
of his History of England gives an interesting account of a practical
recall of a judicial opinion some 500 years ago. The method was
singularly effective-a Parliament subservient to the powerful barons
not only recalled the "Opinions of Nottingham," but decapitated their
utterer, Sir Robert Tresilian, Chief Justice of the King's bench. "His-
tory," Carlyle says, "is but Philosophy teaching by example." Analogy,
then, is Philosophy's assistant, and despite the claims advanced by their
proponents, few of our modern theories will be found which have not
been put into practice in the past.
The purpose of this paper is to tell the story of the Old and New
Court Controversy in Kentucky (1820-1826) as a practical illustration
of the working of the Recall, both of Judges and their desicions, and also
to point out as a matter of interest, and not by way of criticism, some
remarkable similarities in the shibboleths and arguments of parties in
that day and in this.*
*Tfe sources of this paper are the several histories of Kentucky papers
by John A. McClung and Walter Jacobs, and especially "The Patriot" and
"The Spirit of '76." "The Patriot" and "The Spirit of '76" were weekly
Journals in Frankfort during the latter part of the controversy and were
organs of the New and Old Court parties respectively.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.
The restoration of peace in Europe following the Napoleonic wars,
was soon followed by a resumption of specie payments. A great fall in
the nominal value of commodities took place and wide spread bank-
ruptcy ensued. European insolvency tended to produce, more slowly
than it would today but still effectually, a like low state of business on
this side of the Atlantic. This sympathetic depression was intensified by
similar conditions already existing in America. The war of 1812 had
left in the Atlantic states in business paralysis. Manufactures stood still,
agriculture was unremunerative, prices were at rock bottom. The eyes
of the financially cramped turned to the West, to the new states of
Indiana, Ohio, Illinois and Kentucky, and a host of immigrants swept
over the mountains. Their coming brought on in the new states a period
of unhealthy business activity which gave rise to wild and reckless
speculation. Boom towns, like Chuzzlewit's Eden, were laid out on
paper, lots were purchased on credit and houses built on hopes. Mer-
chants bought on time and sold on time to a people who confidently
expected to realize on sales to the penniless new immigrants.
In 1817 Kentucky chartered forty banks which, by law, were per-
mitted to redeem their notes with the paper of the Bank of Kentucky
instead of specie. These banks flooded the State with their notes and
specie was driven out of circulation. Soo:i the bubble burst. Prosperity
vanished, nearly all the banks failed and debts contracted in baseless
optimism began to mature. The period was one of panic followed by
hard times, like the period 1893-1896. In 1820 just as in 1896 the
people looked to the legislative department for relief. A party was
formed pledged to some measure which would relieve the debtor from the
consequences of his rashness. Its shibboleth was "Relief," just as in
1896 it was "Free Silver." The bulk of the followers of all great
popular movements are sincere but their leaders know the value of a
slogan which invites the needy and warms the heart cockles of the down
and out.
In an exciting campaign waged in the summer of 1820 the relief
party elected Governor Adair and a great majority of the legislature.
This legislature chartered the Bank of the Commonwealth and secured
it against suspension by providing that it need not redeem its notes in
specie. "The bank's business was to pour out paper in profusion in
order to male money plenty.". The Bank of Kentucky, a stable institu-
tion hitherto, was required to receive the paper of the Bank of the
Commonwealth in payment of debts due it. The immediate result was
that the stock of the Bank of Kentucky sank to one half of its nominal
value and it suspended specie payments Ahile the paper of the Bank of
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the Commonwealth depreciated to 5G per cent. of its face value imme-
diately after th' bank was chartered.
Thereupon the legislature for the further relief of debtors passed
the famous Endorsement and 'Replevin Act. This Act permitted the
creditor on issuing -execution upon his judgment to endorse thereon
that he would take paper of the Bank of Commonwealthdor of the Bank
of Kentucky in discharge of it. In case such endorsement were made
the execution was to be collected according to the laws then in force,
allowing three months replevin without any further stay. The act
.further provided, that if the plaintiff did not so consent by endorsement
to accept paper in payment, that the debtor might replevy the debt for
two years.
Of course the validity of -this act was soon tested in the courts. It
was first presented in Blair, etc., vs. Williams, in the Bourbon Circuit
Court. The facts were these: On the 12th of November, 1819, (prior
to the passage of the Endorsement and Replevin Act) Blair, Ingles and
Barr, executed their note -to Williams for $209.67y, payable sixty days
after date. The money not being paid when it became due, Williams
sometime thereafter brought suit upon the note in the Bourbon Circuit
Court and recovered judgment for the amount against the makers. The
defendants in accordance with the Replevin Act entered into a recog-
nizance in the clerk's office for the payment of the money within two
years. This recognizance Williams moved the court to quash on the
ground -that the act of assembly under which it was taken was repugnaut
both to the Constitution of the-United States and to the Constitution of
Kentucky. James Clark (afterwards Governor of Kentucky in 1836) the,
then judge of the Bourbon Circuit Court granted the motion to auash
and in an able opinion held that the replevin law was unconstitutional
as to debts contracted before its enactment inasmuch as it impaired the
obligation of contracts.
Judge Clark immediately became the object of bitter denunciation
throughout the state. In May, 1822, he was summoned before a special
session of the legislature, where he defended his decision with areat
ability and firmness. levertheless an address was prepared with a
resolution requiring the removal of the judge from office on the gRround
that "the, principles and doctrines assumed in his opinion were incom-
patible with the constitutional powers of the legislative department of
this government, subversive of the best interests of the people, and
calculated in their consequences, to disturb the tranquility of the country
and to shake the public confidence in the institutions and measures of the
government, called for by the condition and necessities of the people."
The vote on the address for removal stood as follows:
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For It: Messrs. Alexander, Allen, J. S. Anderson, Brooking,
Bruce, Catlett, Clarke, Cockerill, Cooper, Craig, Coombs, Dejarnett,
Desha, Duncan, Eanes, Fletcher, Goode, Gordon, Green, Griffeth, J. G.
Hardin, M. Hardin, Herald, Hughes, Inglish, Jackman, Johnson,
KKinchcloe, Litton, Lecompt, Lee, Lynch, J. Mason, May, McClanahan,
McCracken, Miller, Mullens, Morton, Nolnad, O'Bannon, Patterson,
Payne, Pearcy, Pendleton, Rudd, Selby, Sanford, Shannon, Slack,
Slaughter, Stone of Wayne, J. Taylor, Thompson, Wiley, Witherspoon,
Worthington, Yancey and Younger, 59.
Against It: Speaker Thompson, R. C. Anderson, Bradford, Brents,
Butler, Calhoun, Cogswell, Cosby, Crawford, Davis, Gaither, Howard,
Kincaid, Lockett, Logan, Love, Luckett, B. Mason, McConnell, 'McMil-
lan, Moore, Murray, Pope, Smith, Speed, Stone of Madison, Talbott, C.
H. Taylor, Todd, Warfield, White, Wickliffe and Yantis, 35.
It will be seen that the measure failed of the necessary two-thirds
majority by only a few votes.
To the latter day mind this proceeding seems high-handed and
unjust, and this 'idea has been fostered by all Kentucky historians.
However, Sec. 3, Art. IV. of the Constitution of 1799, under which the
legislature attempted to act, provided that for "any reasonable cause,
which shall not be sufficient ground of impeachment, the Governor shall
remove any judge on the address of two-thirds of each house of the
general assembly!' It should be remembered that in 1822 there was
lacking a century of acquiescence in that long line of court decisions in
which legislative acts have been nullified. True Marburv vs. Madison
had been decided as far back as 1803 while the Kentuckv Court of
Appeals had anticipated. Judge Marshall's celebrated opinion in four
caqe.q-Stod.ger vs. Rogers, 1801; Enderman vs. Ashby, 1801; Gullion
vs. Bowlware's Admr., 1801, and Caldwell vs. Commonwealth, 1802.
Nevertheless there was a widespread popular belief in the right of the
people, through their representatives, to rule. Constitutional interpre-
tation was not in as crystalized form as it is today, and the bearers of the
many honorable names which appear on the affirmative of the above given
vote do not deserve the unqualified and indiscriminate censure which
has become traditional.
The eves of the entire state were now focused on the Court of
Appeals. Its members were John T. Boyle, Chief Justice, and William
Owsley and Benjamin Mills, Associate Justices. These judges composed
what is sometimes referred to in Kentucky as the "Great Court of
Appeals." John A. McClung, a Maysville lawyer, writing in 1846, said
of them: "In simplicity and. purity of character, in profound legal
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knowledge, and in Roman-like firmness of purpose the old Court of
Appeals of Kentucky has seldom been surpassed."
The constitutionality of the replevin act came directly before this
Court in the cases of Blair vs. Williams, referred to above, and Lapsley
and Brashear, the latter case on appeal from the Fayette Circuit Court.
The facts in the latter case are given with bitter humor in a partisan
pamphlet of the time under the following caption:
THE ART OF STAVE OFF.
Illustrated by a History of the famous case of Lapsley
and Brashear; which shews how a Creditor may be kept out of
his just debt due upon a plain bond or note for ten years and
also what are the eventual consequences of such -a course to the
debtor.
The facts may be found in 4 Littell 46. They are somewhat
complicated and the case had dragged on like Jarndyce and Jarndyce.
The leading counsel attacking the replevin law was Robert Wickliffe,
a Cavalier by birth and habit, a great lawyer, hated by his opponents and
dubbed by them "the Duke of Town Fork and Prince Regent of Ken-
tucky." Opposed to him were William T. Barry, James Haggin, John
Rowan and George M. Bibb. The two last named were the equals of any
of their contemporaries; Rowan, a very Webster before an essembly,
and Bibb, a master of calm reasoning and convincing logic.
The decision in the cases was awaited with breathless interest.
Threats of popular vengeance on the court in case it decided against the
Replevin act were freely made. On October 8th, 1823, Chief Justice
Boyle delivered the opinion of the Court in the Blair case and on
October 11th Judge Owsley spoke for the united court in the Lapsley
case. The Replevin Act was pronounced unconstitutional because it
impaired the obligation of contracts. The judges held that the word
obligation of contracts as used in the tenth section of the first Article of
the United States Constitution refers to legal not moral obligations, that
from "obvious justice and intrinsic propriety" the legal obligation of a
contract consists in the remedy given by law to enforce its performance,
that the remedy allowed by law at the date of the contract is its obliga-
tion. Manifestly then the act of assembly in question impaired, that is
"diminished, injured or made worse" the creditor's remedy, which
remedy is identical with his rights and constitutes the obligation of his
contract. Judge Mills in an opinion on both the cases went further than
his colleagues and declared that replevin laws essentially impair the
obligations of contracts, not only when such laws are retrospective but
obligations of contracts, not only when such laws are retrospective but
even when they are prospective. George M. Bibb in a very able and
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exceedingly plausible petition for a rehearing in both the cases, attacked
the doctrine of the idenity of right and remedy and claimed that
"obligation," as used in the Constitution, referred to the natural law.
He further argued that while the Constitution of the United States
prohibited the State from making that no contract which was a contract
when made, and from making the terms of the contract greater or
smaller, it did not prohibit a State from passing laws altering execution
laws, process and courts; and that such purely procedural changes did
not impair the obligations of contracts. Bibbs' petition (which was
denied) appears in 4 Littell 87.
The decisions were received with great anger by -the relief party
who were in control of the general assembly. There was no provision in
the Constitution of 1799 prohibiting the legislature from reducing the
salary of judges during their continuance in office, and the irate relief
majority immediately reduced the salary of each of the offending judges
to twenty-five cents a year. The line between the parties, relief and anti-
relief, became more clearly marked, and the legislative campaign of 1824
was entered upon with the impeachment of the judges as the sole issue.
Kentucky historians have usually indulged in wholesale condemnation of
the relief party. But a perusal of the pamphlet arguments of the cam-
paign convinces one that Rowan, Bibb and Barry had not "sharked up a
list of lawless resolutes.' Their followers were undoubtedly sincere. To
the un-legal mind there was little to choose between the arguments of
Boyle and Bibb, and the pampleteers published in deadly parallel con-
flicting opinions of the Chief Justice upon the essential issue, the identity
of right and remedy. Demagogues there were, of course, who inflame.
the people and persuaded them that the "lawyer faction," living only by
-its wits was foisting upon the State a system of judicial tyranny, but no
popular movement was ever without its demagogues. It is probable
that the relief party, while much more impassioned, was as sincere as
the Bryan Democracy in Kentucky in 1896, and it is the belief of the
writer that it was composed of just as good people and probably of the
same class of people as the regular Kentucky Democracy in 1896.
The result of the election was an overwhelming victory for the
relief party which elected its Governor, Joseph Desha, and a majority of
the legislature. When the assembly convened formal charges were
preferred against the court. The judges appeared before the bar of the
,assembly and: in a long response assigned reasons for their decisions. They
acknowledged their responsibility to the legislature, but claimed it was
limited to impeachment for misconduct by two-thirds vote, and asserted
they were not answerable for errors of judgment. Upon the motion to
impeach the vote stood. In the House:
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For It: Speaker Ward, Messrs. Booker, H. 0. Brown, Buckner,
Buford, Caldwell, Carter, Chenowith, Clarkson, Colenian, Crosby, Dal-
lam, Davis, S .Daveiss, Forrest, Fulton, Galloway, Garth, J. G. Hardin,
X. Hardin, Hodge, Holt, Hunter, Joyes, Litton, Marksberry, Mason,
Maupin, Mayo, McBrayer, J. McConnell, Middleton, Morehead, Morgan,
Mosely, Mullens, Napier, Porter, Prince, Riddle, W. Robertson, Rodman,
Roundiree, Rowan, Samuel, Shortridge, Slack, Spalding, Stephens,
Stone, Summers J. Taylor Thomas, Triplett, Wade, Watkins, Wilcoxen,
W. C. Williams, W. Wilson, Wingate, 60.
Against It: Bates, Breek, Brents, G. I. Brown, Chapeze, Cox,
Crittenden, Cunningham, Evans, Farmer, Ford, Gibson, Goggin, Gordon,
Green, Gresham, B. Hardin, Kennedy, J. M. McConnell, Miller, Morris,
New Oldham, W. Patterson, H. C. Payne, W. C. Payne, G. Robertson,
Simpson Sterrett, Shepherd, R. Taylor, Thurston, True, Turner, Wick-
liffe, L. Williams, Willis, T. P. Wilson and Woods, 39.
In the Senate, the vote stood on the resolution:
For It: C. H. Allen, J. Allen, Balinger, Barrett, Beauchamp, Car-
meal, Daniel, Dawson, Denny, Dudley, Ewing, Forsythe, Hughes, Lyon,
Maccoun, Mayo, P. N. Ogannon, Selby, Smith, T. Ward, Worthington
and Yancey, 23.
Against It: C. Allan, Beatty, Bowman, Crutcher, Davidson,
Faulkner, Hickman, Howard, Muldrow, J. Ward, White and Wickliffe,
12.
This was in November but the lack of the required two-thirds
majority was but a temporary impasse to the reliefites. They set about
to do indirectly that which they were unable to do directly. In December
bills were introduced to repeal the law organizing the Court of Appeals
and to reorganize the court by substituting therefor a new court to
consist of a Chief Justice and three associate justices. The bills were
quickly passed and were signed by Governoi Desha, who was an earnest
advocate of the measures.
William T. Bariy was appointed chief justice and James Haggin,
John Trimble and R. H. Davidge, associate justices of the "New" Court
of Appeals. The Old Court claimed that by the Constitution it was a co-
ordinate branch of the State Government, and refused to recognize the
validity of the repealing act. Francis P. Blair (grandfather of the new
senator from Maryland, Blair Lee), the clerk of the New Court made
forcible entry into the house of the old court. The Franklin grand jury
indicted the New Court from Chief Justice to tipstaff for trespass. A
period of judicial duarchy which was the equivalent of anarchy followed.
The two rival Courts, each claiming to be the sole Court of Appeals,
1 • -1 -'___:_ ;_ 1.2 . . . .. .T1 .. .----- "L L " _ _ _ J'l. .
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great majority of the bar of Kentucky recognized the old Court and
brought their appeals before it. A majority of the circuit judges obeyed
its mandates. Some refused to recognize the old Court, while a few
judges obeyed both, declining to decide which was the lawful court.
With the State on the verge of Civil War the question was re-sub-
mitted to the people in the legislative campaign of 1825. The relief
party became the New Court Party, the anti-relief the Old Court Party.
N. S. Shaler in his history of Kentucky says:
"Then came a bloodless campaign, which for energy and bitterness
has never been equalled in the history of the State, if ever among
English speaking people. Not even the elections immediately preceeding
the Civil War gave anything like the same fury to men's minds as did
the struggle between the Old and New Court parties in the election of
1825. In the canvas of 1860 everyone felt that there was a great
elemental storm arising that might sweep the land to destruction. This
subdued the fury of partisanship."
This campaign of 1825 bears striking resemblance to the Presi-
dential campaign of 1912; especially in its slogans, its shibboleths and
its catch vote arguments. "Shall the people rule ?" was the insistent
was of the Progressive party in 1912. In the New Court organ, "The
slogan apostrophe of the New Court party in 1825 and 1826 just as it
Patriot," a writer who subscribed himself "Junius" and who consciously
modelled his style and his argument after the Great Vitriolic Unknown,
week after week devoted pages to narrating the unjust judicial acts of
Lord Bacon and Lord Jeifries. In the campaign of 1912 a leading
Progressive orator exclaimed: "It was a judicial decision which made
possible the Bloody Assizes of the infamous Jeffries; it was a judicial
decision which fixed the guilt of the witches of Salem; it was a
judicial decision which forced Socrates to drink the deadly hemlock, and
it was following a judicial decision that the Lord Jesus Christ wa
hanged upon a tree."
But the New Court leaders were sincere, even in the to us extreme
step of repealing the act organizing the Court of Appeals. Had he not
been sincere, John Rowan, one of the ablest of the New Court men
would hardly have gone out of his way to defend the reorganization
principle before such an able body as the United States Senate of 1825.
Rowan had just been elected Senator and his speech upon. the Judiciary
bill is so like the new "people rule" thought of today that his peroration
is here given:
Mr. President: I am one of those who believe that the people do not
belong to the judges; that the office of judge is created by the people, for
their convenience, and may be vacated by the same power that created it,
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when the public interest, or convenience shall require it. The commis-
sion of the judge is but his letter of attorney, but the evidence of his
authority, to act as the agent of the people, which may be revoked, like
all other powers, at the pleasure of the principal. When you take the
judge from the office, you must proceed by impeachment, -and act by the
constitutional majority upon him, upon the man. When you wish to
take the office from the judge, you do it by the same process, that you
created it; you create the office, and confer the jurisdiction by law, and
by law you can repeal them. This modern doctrine, that the tenure of
his office by the judge would be too precarious if it depended upon the
will of the people, strikes at the root of free government. You can have
nothing in free government, more stable than the will of the people."
"It is absurd to look to the will of the judge for stability in govern-
ment. He is a -tyrant, when he substitutes him own will, for that of the
people. It is in their will, and not in his, that the force of his judg-
ments, and decrees, is to be found.
"Away then, Mr. President, with all this delusive jargon, about the
stability of the judiciary; and the tumultuary and restless impatience of
the people. The people are never impatient, but under unjust privation;
it has been the misfortune of the world, that the people have always been
too forbearing and patient. They never act, until oppression becomes
intolerable, -and then it is unhappily too late. They awake only to their
wrongs, when their liberty is gone, and with it, the power of redressing
'their wrongs. They make an unavailing effort, perhaps a succession of
efforts, to vindicate their rights; and the usurpers imprudently impute to
the struggles made t osave their liberty, a restlessness of spirit in t he
people, incompatible with its enjoyments. Sir, all experience proves the
truth of what I say. Sir, why should the people surrender their freedom?
Why should they surrender self government? Nature made them
free, gave them an organic fitness for its enjoyment, and in the power
of will, the means of maintaining it. Freedom is the natural state of
man, slavery is a forced state; the activity of freedom is charged upon
the people, as the spirit of restlessness, of insubordination, and disorder.
Sir, this is the cant of power, the lullaby by which liberty has been
charmed into repose, -and shorn of her strength while she slept."
The appeal to the people resulted this time in an overwhelming
victory for the Old Court party which elected a large majority of the
lower house of the legislature. There were, however, a sufficient number
of hold-overs in the Senate to defeat a bill restoring the Old Court of
Appeals. In 1826 came the final struggle the result of which gave the
Old Court a majority in both houess. Over Governor Desha's veto the
reorzanizini act was repealed and the three old judges were re-estab-
12 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.
lished. Their back salaries were voted to them. The seventy-seve.
cases decided by the New Court are reported in 2 T. B. Monroe. They
have never been cited as authority in Kentucky. Thus ended this
momentous controversy. The recall was .itself recalled. With remark-
able facility the defeated New Court party forgot their bitterness and
almost to a man became absorbed followers of the rising fortunes of
Andrew Jackson*-even as their grandsons in 1900 forgot the defeat of
Free Silver four years before in their zealous devotion to the memory
of William Goebel.
ALLEN GULLION.
*Andrew Jackson was preeminently a believer In the right of the people
to rule. This was the reason for his wholesale removals from office. This was
why he destroyed the United States Bank. Henry Clay had made it the Cam-
paign issue and Jackson fearlessly carried into effect what he interpreted as the
people's voice. During the whole of the Old-New Court Controversy, Clay,
Adam's Secretary of State, conservative by nature, kept aloof, a wise discretion
to which his pliant nature easily adapted itself. An interesting study might be
made of the genealogy of the two political parties in Kentucky today;- a study
based upon the political alliances of Kentucky families from 1825 to the
present. In the opinion of the writer the story is briefly this;- In 1825 the
division was the logical one, that between Liberals and Conservatives. It zo
continued until the Civil War, the ancestor of the present Democratic party In
Kentucky being the Liberal party. The war, Reconstruction, and the Negro
since the war, disturbed the balance, throwing the bulk of the wealth and
trained intelligence into the Democratic party. In 1896 the war, its con-
comitants and its results were too far In the rear to weigh against the
radicalism of Free Silver and many Conserative families left the party and.
became Republicans, a Whiggish reversion to type. Eventually no matter
under what names, the essential division must be the logical one of 1825-.
between Liberals and Conservatives.
